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Introduction
In the standard framework modeling human capital investments, decision-makers have complete and accurate information on the costs and expected benefits of each schooling level. This enables them to make optimal schooling choices. Increasingly, new results from the development and economics of education literatures are challenging this assumption. For example, Jensen (2010) shows that providing children with basic information on average earnings increased education of treated students by 0.2 years. Other randomized controlled trials have shown that providing information to students or parents about the benefits and/or costs of investing in higher levels of education improves school attendance, grades, application choices and enrollment outcomes at different levels of schooling.
2
Whether providing information affects human capital investments and what choices this information can affect may depend on context. In the case of higher education, students in many parts of the world encounter a two-tier structure comprised of a selective and a less selective system. The selective system includes a small number of schools of high and relatively homogeneous quality. Access to this system is merit-based, typically determined by performance on national tests, and usually managed through a centralized applications process. 3 In contrast, the less selective system is often populated by a larger number of new, for-profit schools of heterogeneous quality. Eligibility requirements are lower in these schools, and the application process decentralized. The role of information in helping students to make better choices in this environment is arguably more important for students considering the less selective sector. 4 So far, however, the literature has either focused on information interventions targeted at schools in the selective system (e.g., Hoxby and Turner, 2013) or does not differentiate between access to selective and less selective sectors (e.g., Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2015) .
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In this paper, we describe the results of a randomized field experiment conducted with
Grade 12 students in Chile that we designed to explore the effects of giving students tailored information on financial aid and economic returns in a context where selective and less selective systems of higher education coexist. Specifically, we tailored our information treatments to student preferences for careers and schools, collected at baseline. We measure the impacts of the treatments on the extensive margin of enrollment in each of the selective and less selective sectors and on the intensive margin of school choice, conditional on enrollment.
There are three distinguishing features of our study. First, we designed the intervention to be inexpensive and scalable: treated students receive information treatments by email at the time of the intervention, which coincides with the process of applications to post-secondary school and to financial aid for higher education. Several important studies analyze how information about higher education affects decisions in the United States and find large positive effects on extensive margin outcomes of enrollment. However, these information treatments tend to be coupled with more expensive subsidies and/or guidance through the application process (e.g., Bettinger et al., 2012; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013; and Hoxby and Turner, 2013) . In contrast, our intervention involves only information.
Second, since preferences about careers and schools may significantly constrain student choices about where to enroll, our intervention accounts for preferences by providing students with tailored information. This differs from most of the literature, in which more general, aggregate information is provided. 6 We elicit student preferences regarding careers and schools at baseline. Then we provide them with information about financial aid, potential average wage returns, and expected employability for their specific preferred career-school combination as well as for alternative schools that offer the same or similar career paths.
Third, we provide students with information about career and school options in both the selective and less selective sectors. Our treatments include information on elite universities in the 5 Kerr et al. (201r) find no impacts of an information intervention on applications or enrollment in the highly centralized system of higher education in Finland. They argue that information interventions may have little impact when preferences for specific careers have high consumption value, or when popular careers are heavily oversubscribed, as in the Finnish context. 6 Recent exceptions are Hoxby and Turner (2013) and Hastings, Nielson and Zimmerman (2015) .
selective system and information regarding less selective universities, professional schools and technical/vocational colleges. We show that because there is substantial sorting of students across the selective and the less selective sectors based on college entry exam scores, information treatments have less room to-and in fact do not-impact access to the selective sector. Whether information treatments have larger impacts for students who are excluded from the selective school system is an empirical question, which we are also able to address.
Our first result is that delivering tailored information via email was a feasible and inexpensive method of reaching out to students at the time they were managing the transition to higher education. The downside of this delivery mechanism was low uptake. At most, half of the students received and opened our treatment emails. As a result, our study is underpowered to detect small impacts for many outcomes.
Turning to impacts, we find no evidence that exposure to tailored financial aid information affected applications to or enrollment in schools in the selective system. 7 This allows us to assess the impact of our treatments on the extensive and intensive margins of choice in the less selective sector, without concerns about sample selection. In the subsample of students not enrolling in any selective school, we find no statistically significant impacts of any information treatments on extensive margin choices about enrollment in the less selective schools. These extensive margin estimates are noisy, but small relative to control group means.
We do find that exposure to financial aid and returns information affects intensive margin decisions in the less selective sector, for the subsample of students choosing to enroll in the less selective sector. We show that our treatment nudges students to enroll in schools suggested in the treatment emails, and to enroll in suggested schools of a quality higher than their baseline preferences. Treated students switch away from for-profit universities and towards professional institutes. They enroll in schools with lower average expected wages and lower expected employment probabilities, but offering shorter degree programs at lower tuition cost (although these last impacts are not estimated precisely). Using college entry exam scores as a proxy for the baseline level of information a student has about expected returns, we show that our 7 Because of the timing of the intervention, we cannot estimate the impacts of exposure to the returns information on extensive margin choices in the selective sector. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 3.2.
information treatment changed the school choices of the lowest-scoring (most misinformed) students the most.
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Our results on the lack of impacts on access to the selective sector are in line with results from a recent study by Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) who analyze the impacts of a similar information experiment in a sample of higher education loan applicants in Chile. In that study, loan applicants receive information via email and the web about returns (expected wages and tuition) to different programs of study at different schools, according to their baseline preferences. Similar to our estimates but in a different sample, they find that their treatment has no impacts on the extensive margin of enrollment in higher education overall and small positive impacts on their calculations of expected net value from enrolling in a program of higher education. Our study is complementary to theirs in highlighting the feasibility, and relevance, of providing tailored information to students seeking to enter higher education.
Our results have two broad implications. First, although we demonstrate that it is possible to scale up even highly tailored information interventions at low cost, such interventions are likely to have small effects on access to selective schools when the process for applying to these universities is well-known, centralized, and coordinated as is the case in Chile. If the selective system is already over-subscribed by the best students-those with the highest entrylevel test scores and high school grades-there is little room for affecting the distribution of slots across students using an information intervention at the end of high school. Information at this point is unlikely to level the playing field for lower-scoring students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Moreover, information interventions of this type are also unlikely to have large impacts on access to the less selective school system.
The second more novel implication of our results is that governments may still have a role to play in changing the allocation of students to schools in the less selective system by providing inexpensive and targeted information on the costs and benefits of post-secondary schooling. Such information will be relevant for the majority of students who do not gain access to the most selective schools and who must decide where it is worthwhile to invest in tertiary education. It is also likely to be important in any educational system in which the number of forprofit schools has recently expanded and where information about their quality is limited.
Section 2 provides some background on the higher education sector in Chile, distinguishing between the selective and less selective systems, while Section 3 describes the details of our experiment. Section 4 describes our data, Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy and Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 discusses the results and the costs of the intervention, and concludes.
Post-Secondary Schooling in Chile
There are three main types of post-secondary institutions in Chile: universities (public, private, and public-private) that offer traditional five-year degree programs, professional institutes that offer some traditional and some technical degrees, and technical/vocational training colleges that focus on shorter, two to three-year programs with technical training. Graduating high school seniors apply to a specific career in a specific school, for example, engineering at the University of Chile or mechanics at a technical college. 9 The most prestigious institutions are part of the selective school system, while other schools are less selective in regard to applicants.
The selective school system consists of about 33 schools, including the oldest, traditional public universities, and some universities with private and combined public-private funding. To enroll in one of these schools, students must apply to and be accepted by the centralized DEMRE (Departamento de Evaluación, Medición y Registro Educacional) system at the end of their final year in high school. DEMRE (selective) schools are considered selective because eligible students typically need to have high GPA scores during high school and high minimum scores on the college entry examination (the Prueba de Selección Universitaria, PSU, which is like the SAT for U.S. students). 10 Schools in this system are oversubscribed: in 2014, there were 1.25 applications for each available slot (DEMRE, 2015) .
9 Specialization occurs early in Chile, where schools admit students to specific degree programs for a specific career and where switching careers later on is almost impossible. This implies considerable "lock in" for enrollment decisions. 10 The PSU is offered once per year in December and is free for students in any high school with public funding. Once students find out their PSU scores in late December, they have a two-day window in which to apply to their top six choices of selective schools through the centralized DEMRE application system. Solis (2015) describes how, unlike in the United States, entry to the selective tier of tertiary education in Chile depends only on high school and PSU scores. Extra-curriculars and other aspects of a candidate do not affect probabilities of acceptance.
In contrast, applications to the remaining 129 non-DEMRE (less selective) schools (SIES, 2014)-some private universities, the majority of professional institutes, and all technical colleges-are decentralized, and entry requirements are lower. For example, PSU eligibility cutoff scores are lower on average relative to cut-offs for schools in the selective system. In some less selective schools, students do not require a PSU score to gain entry.
The quality of institutions varies both across and within the selective and less selective school systems. For example, the Chilean government certifies the quality of many degree programs and institutions by awarding them "accreditation status" from 1 (lowest quality) to 7
(highest quality) years. Schools choose to be accredited, and only 52 percent of institutions have an accreditation score (SIES, 2014) . On average, schools in the less selective system have lower accreditation scores and many of them have no accreditation score at all. However, there is a range in quality measures within each system. Within the selective system, accreditation scores range from 2 to 7, while within the less selective system, scores in accredited schools range from 1 to 7.
The majority of growth in enrollment in higher education in Chile since the early 1990s has been in this less selective sector, particularly in professional schools and private universities (OECD, 2012) . By 2012, 27 percent of all students in higher education attended schools in the selective system, 33.2 percent in less selective universities, 26.2 percent in professional schools and 12.4 percent in less selective vocational schools. The decision to enter higher education through less selective institutions has therefore become much more salient among recent high school graduates.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how students sort across selective and less selective school systems based on PSU scores. The first figure shows the (kernel-smoothed) distribution of PSU test scores of students in our control group who applied to any selective school, and a separate distribution for those who choose not to apply to any selective school. There is some overlap in the distributions, but the figure also suggests a high degree of sorting by PSU score. Below a score of 400, almost nobody applies to the selective system. Above 600, almost nobody applies to a less selective school. This sorting continues into the enrollment stage. Figure 2 shows the share of control group students who enroll in any selective school (solid line), any non-selective school (dashed line), or who chose not to enroll in any higher education at all (dotted line) by PSU score. The lines cross at a score of 540. Among students with scores higher than 540, 40 percent or more enroll in a selective school and with scores above 600, 60 percent or more enroll. Less than 10 percent of students with scores of 600 or more enroll in the less selective system. At the other end of the score distribution, about half of students with PSU scores between 300 and 540 enroll in some less selective institution. Most other students scoring in this low range do not enroll anywhere.
PSU scores are also important in qualifying for many forms of government aid, and for some types of privately provided financial aid. Scores above 475 are particularly salient, since they qualify a student to receive one of the two largest government loans. These loans are not restricted to specific programs of study and can be used for study in selective and less selective schools. There is good evidence that Chilean students are credit constrained; according to Solis 
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The top part of Figure 3 shows the timeline facing students who want to enter higher education. Students first apply for the major sources of general financial aid (state scholarships and loans) administered centrally, before writing the PSU and learning their scores. After learning the results of the PSU test, students may apply to selective schools, supplying a maximum of eight choices to the centralized selective system. This system allocates students to spots in career-school combinations based on their PSU and high school GPA scores; the central government allocates financial aid to students conditional on their PSU scores meeting eligibility cut-offs, their financial need and the accreditation of the institution of higher education.
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Throughout this period, students may also apply to other sources of financial aid not allocated by the central government. Information about these other sources is decentralized, often down to the level of the school and program, and deadlines for applications are idiosyncratic.
Students find out the outcomes of these centralized university and financial aid applications by early/mid-January. Students not admitted to a selective school, as well as those who choose not to apply to or enroll in a selective school can then choose to apply to one of the 11 Solis (2015) uses a regression discontinuity design to show that obtaining access to a government loan doubles college enrollment in Chile. 12 The two large government-sponsored programs are the loan program (Crédito con Aval del Estado) and a scholarship program (Bicentenario, among others). 13 In 2014, 89 percent of all state loans and scholarships were awarded in this first round.
less selective institutions. They may also choose not to enroll in any higher education after the end of high school. Applications to less selective institutions continue into late February when students also have a second chance to apply for remaining government-sponsored scholarships and other decentralized sources of financial aid. By early March, when the new school year starts, the market in each of the selective and less selective systems has mostly cleared.
Applications to and decisions for the selective and less selective systems occur almost sequentially. This allows us to examine student choices in two distinct stages of their transition to higher education. In Stage 1, we look at choices of our entire sample during the early part of the admissions process that focuses on selective schools. In Stage 2, the later part of the admissions process, we examine subsequent decisions of students who do not enter a selective school on their remaining alternatives in the less selective system.
Experimental Design

Sample: Recruitment and Randomization
We worked with a Chilean NGO, Por Una Carrera (PUC), to visit over 300 school career fairs in the greater Santiago region between July 2013 and November 2013. At the PUC booths, we collected over 10,000 emails from Grade 12 students, along with their preferences regarding post-secondary careers and institutions. Our sampling frame is more geographically targeted than the sampling frame used in Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) . We use relatively poor neighborhoods in Santiago, while they use the universe of government loan applicants. Another difference between our sample and theirs is that ours includes both students who will, and those who will not, go on to apply for government loans. We invited students to participate in our study by sending them a web link to our baseline survey; respondents had two weeks to complete the online survey.
We stratified the sample using baseline information on gender and on whether a student's parents had completed any tertiary education, or not, or had missing education information.
Between October and December 2013, we randomized students into an information treatment and control group on a rolling basis, following a re-randomization protocol to maintain cumulative balance in the combined sample. 14 All treated students received the financial aid treatment: information on financial aid possibilities tailored to their baseline career-school preferences. Half of the treated students also received a returns treatment: information on expected returns related to their baseline preferences. 
Description of Treatments and Timeline of Intervention
We sent our emails close to the time of decision-making (November-February). This was to ensure that students had given some thought to their desired program of study, and to prevent the loss of too much information between the time of the treatment and the time of actual choices.
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Control group: The control group received one email inviting them to learn about possible careers at www.eligecarrera.cl. This publicly accessible official website contains general information on types of careers, loans and scholarships available at different schools, eligibility criteria for these programs and financing options. Students in the treatment group also received a link to the same website in their treatment emails.
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Financial aid treatment: All treatment students received information about how to access general types of financial aid offered through the centrally administered public loan and scholarship programs. The distinguishing feature of our financial aid treatment was that every student also received personalized information about alternative specific financial aid opportunities linked to their baseline preferences or background characteristics. They received information about specific scholarships or loans offered by private schools or firms, by certain municipalities, and by specific programs and career tracks within certain schools. Because these alternative types of financial aid are not centrally administered, it is typically more costly to learn about them. Our financial aid treatment sought to reduce this learning cost. Volunteers searched academic performance listed in Panel B of Table 3 , expected wage, expected probability of employment and expected probability of getting a scholarship. We used a simple Euclidean distance function to map the differences between treated and control means across covariates and across treatment arms to a scalar. We selected the pseudorandom number generator seed (from a set of 10,000 randomly generated seeds) that minimized that distance function. 15 We did not have a sufficiently large sample to implement a pure returns-only treatment. 16 Dinkelman and Martínez A. (2014) show that Grade 8 students on their own retained very little information four months after they viewed a DVD providing them with information about how to prepare for successful financial aid applications at the end of high school. In results not shown in that paper, student recall of information immediately after watching the DVD was significantly greater than recall four months after the treatment. 17 The website is maintained by the Consejo Nacional de Educación.
for each student's personalized information on alternative sources of loans and scholarships, and they provided this to them in an email.
18 Table 1 describes the types of information provided in the financial aid treatment.
Appendix 1 presents the full the email template (in English and Spanish) designed for this treatment. In some cases, the information provided was specific to the preferred career, or subarea or area of study if no career preference was given, and relevant for multiple institutions. In other cases, the information was specific to an institution. Where socio-economic status or PSU score and high school GPA was relevant for eligibility, the PUC volunteers tailored their advice to these characteristics. For example: a student who had a PSU score that was not high enough to attend the top public institutions in Chile would not have received information on scholarships or loans specific to these institutions, but instead would have been given information on schools that were feasible targets of application given their scores.
We administered the financial aid treatment to students in December 2013, after applications to the government-sponsored general loan and scholarship programs had closed and after writing the PSU, but before the deadlines for applying to selective and less selective schools and most other sources of specific financial aid. We monitored the first email from the NGO staff for treatment compliance, but did not monitor subsequent interactions between volunteers and students. We expect that the financial aid treatment could have affected student choices about applying to and enrolling in selective and less selective schools. It may also have affected the types of schools to which students apply. We examine all of these outcomes in our analyses.
We also expect this treatment to affect their application to and receipt of non-state financial aid.
Unfortunately, there are no centralized data available to measure these outcomes.
Returns treatment: To construct information for the returns treatment, we gathered data from the publicly accessible MiFuturo database (www.MiFuturo.cl) of 2013. This database reports average monthly earnings and average employability rates for recent graduates of specific career-school programs.
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18 We did not design the content of the financial aid treatment emails; we designed the structure of the email, and relied on the expertise in the NGO to fill in the relevant cells from their database. 19 Income and employment statistics are computed from IRS data, although it is not clear how the statistics are created. The MiFuturo data represent average returns rather than causal estimates of the impact of specific degreeschool combinations for marginal students as in Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) . We merged MiFuturo with the 2012 and 2013 National Council of Education databases (CNED) to identify schools and types of institutions. Table 2 summarizes the types of information provided to students in the returns treatment, given their baseline career-school preferences. The appendix presents the full text of the email template (in English and Spanish) for this treatment. Students received returns information for their specific preference and for schools in four alternative categories offering their same career. Up to three schools in each of the selective and less selective systems were listed, for each of two quality tiers. 20 To define three quality tiers, we ranked schools within the selective and less selective systems based on their years of accreditation (high, medium, and low levels of accreditation). Students were given information on schools from each of the selective and less selective systems in the same quality tercile as their baseline preference, and in a lower quality tercile. 21 The rationale behind providing information on lower quality tier schools relative to baseline preferences was that if a student did not gain access to their first choice school, they might be successful at a lower-quality institution. However, we did not label schools as selective or less selective. The email only listed a set of alternative schools along with associated average wages and employability data.
Half of the students in the financial aid treatment were randomized into receiving the returns treatment. Because of a delay in preparing the returns treatment, the treatment was administered after the deadline for applications to selective schools had passed but before the main period of applications to less selective schools. That is, the financial aid treatment was delivered after students had applied to the first round of central government funding and before the end of applications to selective schools. The returns treatment came after applications to selective schools had concluded but before results were released and before the second round of government funding closed. Both treatments were delivered before the process of applications for less selective schools closed, and while applications for decentralized sources of funding was still ongoing.
The returns treatment was sent via a University of Chile email account, and we had full control over the content of these emails. Because of the timing of the returns intervention, we cannot affect intensive margin choices of where to apply among those applying to selective schools. Moreover, because an allocation algorithm manages how students are assigned to schools and programs within this selective system, there is almost no flexibility for students to make intensive margin changes in the type of selective school in which they enroll in response to our information treatment. Therefore, we expect that the returns treatment may affect extensive margin enrollment choices into the less selective school system, and may also change intensive margin choices on the types of less selective schools in which students enroll.
Data
Survey Data
We collected baseline survey data from 1,727 Grade 12 students between October 2013 and December 2013. These students responded to our initial email invitation to be part of the study and filled out an online survey, providing basic demographic information and confirming their preferences reported at career fairs regarding specific career, sub-area or area of study and preferred institution of study. Respondents reported on measures of their own ability (expected high school GPA and expected score on the PSU exam) and their expectations about access to finance for higher education, future earnings and future employment probabilities in their preferred careers.
Appendix Table 1 compares students in our experimental sample with the larger sample of career fair students. Our sample students expect to achieve higher high school grades and scores on the PSU relative to career fair students. They are also more likely to list at least one selective school in a baseline preference, and significantly less likely to list at least one less selective school. However, they resemble the larger sample of students on most other dimensions-e.g., demographics, self-reported poverty score, and the distribution of preferences for careers. 22 Appendix Table 2 compares the demographics of our experimental sample to the universe of PSU exam takers. Our sample is relatively more female, with lower high school 22 About one fifth of the sample is interested in careers in technology or social sciences, law and teaching; the rest are distributed across management and business (16 percent), health sciences (28 percent) and remaining categories like humanities, architecture, and natural sciences (13 percent).
GPA, and somewhat higher household income, but from similar family backgrounds as measured by mother and father education.
The majority of students enter our study with "complete preferences," meaning that they have a well-defined idea of what they want to study, and where. About 95 percent of the experimental sample provided information about a specific career preference, and 80 percent provided both a preferred career and preferred school, although not all students had accurate information (e.g., some provided a career-school preference that did not exist at a particular school). Most of the remaining 5 percent without any career information provided some general preference information (e.g., the sub-area or area of preferred study) and a minority reported that they had "no idea" about what to study.
Administrative Data
We matched our experimental sample to administrative databases using unique national identification numbers from the Chilean Ministry of Education. The data include PSU scores, applications to the selective school system and the outcome of that application at the end of 2013
(acceptance into and enrollment in a selective school-career or not), enrollment in any less selective school-career, characteristics (type of institution, measures of school quality) of the school in which the student eventually enrolled in 2014, and receipt of government financial aid. 23 We can also tell whether a student graduated from high school in 2013; we exclude 59 students who failed to graduate from our final analysis sample of 1,668 students. Summary statistics for the administrative data outcomes are in Appendix Table 3 .
Almost everyone (1,602 students, 96 percent of the sample) took the PSU exam and, of those students, 879 (or 53 percent) chose to apply to at least one selective school. By March 2014, 1,206 students were enrolled in some higher education (72 percent of the sample), with 48 percent enrolling in selective universities, 17 percent enrolling in less selective universities, 23 percent in professional schools and 10 percent in technical schools. Receipt of centrally allocated financial aid from the government is highly prevalent. Three-quarters of all enrollees have some form of government aid (scholarship or loan), 60 percent of enrolled students have some government scholarship, and 43 percent have a government-backed loan. These sources of financial aid are not mutually exclusive: 22 percent of enrollees have both a government-backed 23 Note that because the less selective school system is decentralized, we cannot measure applications to schools in this system; we also cannot measure receipt of one of the many sources of private scholarship and loan programs.
loan and a scholarship (not shown). As noted above, we have no data on the share of enrolled students that also receive financial aid from non-federal government sources.
It is worth noting that the 73 percent enrollment rate in our sample is quite a bit higher than national enrollment rates for young adults. In 2013, the share of 18 to 20-year-olds enrolled in school was 46 percent (CASEN, 2013) . Likewise, the share of our sample with access to financial aid through loans and scholarships is slightly higher than rates of access in national data, in which 65 percent of enrollees (ages 18 to 20) have some government loan or scholarship (CASEN, 2013) . These higher shares make sense, given that we recruited from among the policy-relevant group of Grade 12 students who attended career fairs and expressed interest in wanting information about post-secondary schooling.
Empirical Strategy
We proceed in three steps. First, we use the full analysis sample to examine the impacts of exposure to the financial aid treatment relative to the control group. We focus on impacts on the extensive margin of applications and acceptance into, and enrollment in, selective schools. We estimate intent to treat effects (a 1 ) using student-level data (i) and regressions of the following sort:
where F i is an indicator variable equal to one if student i received the financial aid treatment at all, k i is a set of six stratum fixed effects for gender and level of parent education (less than tertiary education, some tertiary education, or missing education information), e i is an idiosyncratic error term and we estimate robust standard errors. We also control for baseline expected high school GPA score and expected PSU score, GPA i and PSU i .
We do not find large impacts on margins related to the selective school system. That is, the financial aid information treatment had no statistically significant impact on who applies to, is accepted into, or enrolls in, a selective school. This implies suggests that our treatment does not affect selection into, or out of the selective school system. To proceed, we shrink our sample to the subset of students who do not enroll in the selective school system. We show that treatment and control groups in this subsample have balanced characteristics at baseline.
In the second step, we then use this sample of students (non-enrollees in the selective system) to analyze the impact of the two information treatments (F i alone, and R i for returns plus financial aid) on extensive margin choices on schools in the less selective sector. This subsample includes all those who choose not to apply to selective schools (about half of the full sample), those who are not accepted into the selective system (9.5 percent of the full sample), and those who choose not to enroll in selective schools conditional on acceptance (about 8.8 percent of the full sample). These students are overwhelmingly middle and low-PSU scoring students.
Within this sample, we estimate (2):
for enrollment in less selective schools (relative to no enrollment). This enrollment variable summarizes the outcome of extensive margin choices in the less selective system, since administrative data on applications to and acceptance into less selective schools does not exist. If we assume that the effects of each treatment are additive, then the difference between b 2 and b 1
captures the additional impact of providing only the returns information.
In the third and final step, we investigate whether the information treatments changed the characteristics of the less selective schools in which students enrolled. Again, because we find no evidence of either treatment changing extensive margin choices into enrollment in the less selective sector, we restrict our analysis to the subsample of those who enroll in any less selective school. Again, this sample is balanced on observables at baseline. In this subsample, we ask whether students responded to the specific information provided in the returns treatment.
Then, we ask whether students chose different types of schools (e.g., non-college versus college, programs with different wages, employability, tuition and duration) in response to the treatments.
Our results provide insight into how information provision affects the intensive margin of school choice, among those constrained to select schools within the less selective sector. Table 3 shows that the experimental treatment and control groups are balanced across a range of observable characteristics at baseline. For each variable, we show the control mean (and standard deviation), the coefficients (and standard errors) on each indicator of treatment group-financial aid treatment and financial aid plus returns treatment-and the sample size with non-missing data. 24 We estimate the coefficients of the balance regressions including stratum fixed effects (k i ) and report robust standard errors. All variables are balanced at baseline.
Results
Baseline Characteristics and Balance
The first four columns pertain to the full sample. The average student in our sample is 17.5 years old. Almost one in five respondents reports being in one of the bottom two quintiles of household income and on average, 12 percent of people are poor in the municipalities represented in our sample. Almost everyone expects to take the PSU exam, and one in four respondents spends more than four hours per week studying for the exam. Seventy-five percent of the sample lists at least one school from the selective system in their baseline preferences (we asked about first and second choice at baseline), and over 90 percent of respondents list at least one school from the less selective system. Students place reasonably high probabilities on getting state or private (59 percent) scholarships for further study, and 55 percent of students anticipate being able to use a loan if they do not get scholarship funding. However, almost one quarter of the sample has no plan about how to finance higher education without scholarship funding.
Students come into the applications process with relatively poor information about future returns. Expectations on predicted future returns (wages and employment probabilities) for people with their preferred degree are missing for a large share of the sample, suggesting that students had a difficult time answering these questions. Among those who do answer these survey questions, 73 percent expect that graduates with their preferred degree find a job, which is an underestimate relative to actual employment rates among cohorts age 25-35 with any further education; according to CASEN (2013) , the employment rate among these cohorts is 84 percent.
At the same time, students tend to overestimate wages for people with their preferred degree.
Three-quarters of respondents with non-missing data expect that monthly wages are over 600,000 pesos. This is 1.6 times the median monthly wage for similarly educated young adults in 2013.
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Combining stated student preferences for being in the selective school system with high expectations regarding PSU score (the average expected score is 589; we calculate that 82 percent of our sample overestimates their actual performance on the PSU) and high wage expectations, we can see this sample is optimistic about their prospects in higher education.
24 Appendix Table 4 shows that missing data are balanced across each of the treatment and control groups for the full sample. Appendix Other work has shown that students routinely overestimate their prospects (e.g. Bobba and Frisancho, 2015) . Compliance was high in each of the treatment groups. Ninety-eight percent of financial aid emails did not bounce, and 96 percent of the returns emails were sent out to the assigned respondents. In only a handful of cases (a maximum of 8 students in any one group) did nonassigned individuals receive any treatment email. Our measures of take-up are much lower. We verify that 10 to 14 percent of students treated with the financial aid treatment responded to their PUC volunteer, as was requested in the first contact email. This measure of take-up is imperfect though, since it is likely that more treated students actually read their email than responded to their PUC volunteer. However, even when we can verify that students received the treatment, as in the case of the returns treatment that we directly administered, only 53 percent of students opened their emails.
Treatment Compliance and Take-Up
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These rates of take-up clearly limit the potential impact the treatment could have on choices and outcomes. We report Intent to Treat (ITT) results instead of instrumenting for treatment using take-up rates. These estimates represent the average effects we can expect when scaling up these information treatments in a population of similar students. Alongside each 26 We worked with a programmer to develop a program that assembled, delivered, and kept track of opened and bounced emails. 27 Compared with other recent experiments that evaluate the role of information and mentoring for college applications and enrollment in the United States, our measurable take-up rate for the financial aid treatment is lower, while the take-up rate for the returns treatment is on par with these other studies. For example, in Carrell and Sacerdote's (2014) college application mentoring program in New Hampshire high schools, the take up rate was around 50 percent. Take-up in this study meant that students actually attended the offered mentoring program. Hoxby and Turner's (2013) information intervention targeted at low-income, high-achieving high school graduates, measured take-up in a subsample of the experimental sample at 23-48 percent. In Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) , less than 50 percent of the treatment group used the searchable information database provided in the intervention.
outcome in our main results tables, we also report minimum detectable effect (MDE) sizes given our sample size and take-up. Table 5 shows how providing financial aid information affects behavior on the extensive margin of entry into the selective school system. The control group mean appears in the first column, and the impact estimate of a 1 in equation (1) is shown in the second column. We present three sets of outcomes: application to any selective school, acceptance into a selective school, and enrollment in a selective school.
Effects of Information Treatments on Extensive Margin Outcomes
Over half of the control group applied to a selective school, and 78 percent of them were accepted (0.41/0.52). In the entire control group, 34 percent enrolled in a selective school, or about 82 percent of those accepted. The second column shows that the financial aid information treatment had no statistically significant impacts on any of these outcomes. The treatment effects are all positive, but relatively small and not statistically significantly different than zero. Low take-up rates in a small sample make it difficult to estimate any small effects precisely: we could only reject fairly large MDEs on these access variables (columns 3), given our experimental set up. Nonetheless, despite the specificity and targeting of the financial aid treatment to student preferences, we can say our information treatment does not have meaningfully large impacts on access to the selective school system.
These results make sense. Selective schools are already oversubscribed and schools can choose from the highest PSU scorers. Students with high enough scores seem to know they are eligible for these schools: they apply, are accepted, and enroll. Lower-scoring students cannot meet the high PSU cut-off scores required for selective school eligibility, and middle-scoring students (i.e., those between 400 and 600) generally cannot compete with the highest scoring students for the limited spots allocated by the centralized process.
Next, we restrict the analysis sample to those students who did not enroll in a selective school. This subsample consists of 1,088 students who did not apply to any selective school (781 respondents), to students who applied but were not offered a place in the selective system (159 students), and to students who applied to and were accepted into the selective system but chose not to enroll (148 respondents). This represents 65 percent of the full sample. Restricting the sample in this way makes sense, because Table 5 gave no strong evidence of extensive margin adjustments into selective schools. The fact that average baseline characteristics are balanced across treatment and control groups in this subsample (see Table 3 , columns 5-8) further reassures us that restricting the sample in this way is reasonable. Table 5 , we show the control mean and treatment effect coefficients for any financial aid treatment in the first two columns. Over half of the control group enrolls in a less selective school, and while the coefficient on the Any financial aid treatment is positive and slightly larger than the similar coefficients in Table 5 , it is not statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 split out the treatment effects into the effect of the financial aid only treatment and the effect of the financial aid in combination with returns treatment. We show the p value of the difference in these coefficients in column (5). Again, the MDE is large (0.109). We are unable to find any large impacts of the information treatment on the extensive margin of enrollment into less selective schools. 
Effects of Information Treatments on Intensive Margins of Choice among Less Selective School Enrollees
In Table 7 , we provide evidence that our information treatments affected intensive margin choices among the subsample of students who were constrained to choose enrollment in schools in the less selective sector and who chose to enroll. We present control means in the first column, an estimate of the impact of Any financial aid treatment (F i or R i ) in column (2), and then estimates of each of the financial aid only and the combined financial aid and returns treatments in columns (3) and (4). Under the assumption that the effects of each information treatment are additive, the difference between the two treatment effects tells us the impact of exposure to the returns treatment. The p value for this difference is given in column (5). The final two columns show the largest MDE associated with each of the separate ITT estimates and the sample size in each regression.
We first check to see whether our treatments nudged students towards choosing schools suggested in the emails. We know the names of the schools suggested in each respondent's returns treatment, and we can construct similar data for the other experimental groups who did not receive the returns treatment. We construct an indicator for whether the respondent enrolled in one of the schools that was (for the returns group) or would have been (for all other groups) suggested by the returns treatment. We construct another indicator that captures whether a student enrolls in a school that was (or would have been) suggested in the returns treatment and was of a higher quality than their preferred school at baseline. Recall, students did not know which quality tier the suggested schools came from, they only received a list of schools and associated average wages and employability.
Panel A shows that our returns treatment in particular nudged students in the direction of enrolling in schools suggested in the treatment emails. Among control students, 61 percent would have enrolled in a less selective school that would have been a good match for them in the returns treatment. Exposure to our information treatments raises this share by 6 percentage points. Moreover, it is the returns treatment specifically that raises the share of students enrolled in a suggested school. Returns treatment students are also more likely to choose suggested schools of higher quality than their baseline preference, relative to the control group. The information about alternative schools seems to have stuck with students, despite low take-up rates.
Panels B, C and D present further evidence that the information treatments changed the types of schools chosen by students constrained to the less selective sector. In Panel B, we show that the information treatment (overall) appears to move students away from private universities and towards professional schools, although these effects in column (2) are not statistically significantly different than zero. Splitting up the treatment effects, we see that the financial aid only treatment moves students towards professional institutes. One potential explanation for this is that the personalized information on decentralized financial aid provided more information about funding in professional institutes, and therefore opened up opportunities in these schools, relative to private universities.
Panel C shows that exposure to both information treatments causes students to choose schools and careers offering around 9 percent lower expected average wages. They also tend to choose schools with lower average employability, although this effect is driven by the interaction of the returns and financial aid treatments. Results for tuition costs and duration of program in Panel D suggest that information treatment students choose shorter, cheaper programs, although these estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The signs of the impact estimates for the expected returns and cost of enrollment outcomes make sense, given that exposure to the information treatments caused students to change enrollment patterns away from private universities towards professional schools (Table 7 , Panel B). Professional schools tend to offer shorter degree programs, and result in lower average wages compared with similar programs in universities.
Who Was Nudged by the Information Treatments?
To understand more about how information is working to cause these intensive margin shifts, we would like to know whether students with the greatest misperceptions about earnings, and those with the least information about financial aid opportunities, respond the most to our treatments.
Unfortunately, because of high item non-response rates in our baseline survey, we do not have good data on baseline earnings expectations or loan and scholarship probabilities for all students in the subsample of less selective school enrollees. This means we cannot explore heterogeneous effects with respect to baseline expectations/information.
To make some headway on this, we use the full sample of students to show that PSU score is highly correlated with non-response to the baseline question about expected earnings in one's preferred career-school program (Appendix Figure 1) . The PSU score is also correlated with the size of the gap between expected earnings and actual average earnings in a given school-career, for the sample of students who responded to the question (Appendix Figure 2) . Therefore, we interpret PSU score as a proxy of how much information students have, with lower scores indicating less information. We split the sample of less selective school enrollees into above and below median PSU scores (median is 475), and estimate results for school choice in this sample for the high and low PSU scorers. (4)), some of the effect is also coming from the financial aid alone treatment. This is most likely because the set of alternative schools and programs suggested in the returns treatment overlapped with decentralized sources of financial aid for schools and programs similar to student baseline preferences that were provided by PUC. The low PSU scorers are also the ones switching out of private universities and towards professional institutes, in response to our information treatments. Because most of the professional institutes and vocational schools have no PSU requirement, it makes sense that the low PSU scorers would be able to respond to the new information by changing their intensive margin choices.
Discussion of Cost Effectiveness
One of the innovations of our project was to test the impact of tailoring information to student preferences in a way that is easily scaled at low cost. The cost of our intervention had three components: the cost of collecting student contact details (emails) at baseline, along with their baseline school and career preferences; the cost of delivering the tailored returns information;
and the cost of delivering the tailored financial aid information.
The first cost would be incurred by any intervention seeking to deliver information via email. 29 The cost of the returns treatment consisted of a fixed cost of designing an algorithm that uses publicly available data to provide the tailored information treatment, and a variable cost of delivering this information. In our experiment, the former amounted to 2.68USD per treated student while the latter was basically zero. The cost of the financial aid treatment also had two components. There was a fixed cost associated with building and updating a database of decentralized financial aid opportunities. Like the fixed costs of the returns treatment, this cost would become negligible the more students are included in the intervention. The only variable cost that is relevant is the cost of compensating workers to match student preferences with financial aid opportunities and send the personalized emails. The NGO used volunteers to perform this task. We compute an upper bound for the cost of employing recent high school graduates to perform this task. Assuming that it takes a worker 30 minutes to search the database on decentralized financial aid to find matches with student preferences and populate an email template with this information, the cost per treated student would be 1.5USD (using the average wage of recent high school graduates). 29 In our case, this was done through student career fairs and cost 1.8USD per student. In other settings, this cost would be incurred by a government collecting student contact details through, for example, a loan application form.
Overall, relative to other interventions that distribute only general information via email, the cost of personalizing returns information is low, as long as there is a public database on wages and employment outcomes for schools and careers. The cost of personalizing financial aid information is somewhat higher since it requires labor to tailor the information to students.
Conclusion
We designed our project to test whether an inexpensive and scalable information intervention could improve access to higher education and affect enrollment choices made by students in an education system with both selective and less selective schools. Two main findings emerge in our analysis. First, we find no evidence that providing tailored information about financial aid and returns to students at the end of high school changes decisions about application or enrollment to higher education. There are no meaningful extensive margin effects in either the selective system or the less selective system. Second, we find the information treatments changed the types and characteristics of the less selective schools in which students enroll.
Treated respondents shift out of private universities, towards professional schools, with students significantly more likely to choose to enroll in institutions suggested in the returns treatment. We provide suggestive evidence that the information treatments (specifically, the returns treatment) changed school choice behavior the most for students with the worst quality information on average returns at baseline.
These intensive margin changes have ambiguous implications for student welfare. While we might be concerned that a shift into programs and schools offering lower wages and employability would reduce student welfare, a shift towards shorter programs that charge lower tuition could have positive or negative effects on predicted net returns. This is even more likely to be the case if treated students were able to access private sources of financial aid at higher rates because of the financial aid treatment, an outcome we are unable to measure because it does not exist in any centralized administrative dataset. Without better data, we are unable to make general statements about the welfare effects of this information intervention.
Despite the problems with statistical power that we face given our small sample size and low take-up rates, this experiment adds to what we know about how information about higher education affects individual choices and outcomes in settings where two tiers of higher education coexist. The insights we generate may be important in many countries where the supply of less selective institutions of higher education has recently grown and where there is great heterogeneity in the quality of these institutions. Governments could still play a role in providing inexpensive and targeted information interventions to help marginal students better understand quality gradients and cost-benefit trade-offs in schools in the less selective sector. Tables   Table 1. 
Servicio de Información de la Educación Superior (SIES
Summary of Financial Aid Treatment Information for a Given Career Preference
Note: Table shows information provided in the financial aid treatment. Specific information is tailored to student career-school preferences at baseline.
Table 2. Summary of Returns Treatment Information for a Given Career Preference
Note: Table shows information provided in the returns treatment based on student career-school preferences at baseline. X is the first choice preferred school at baseline. Quality tiers are defined over each of the selective and less selective systems, by grouping years of government accreditation into three roughly equal bins.
Types of Financial Aid Information Description of information provided
General
Links to application for central government financial aid (scholarships and loans) and YouTube video on how to complete
Specific: Loans
Links to other loan programs for which a student is eligible based on socio-economic status and expected PSU score. More than one link may have been provided.
Specific: Private scholarships offered by an institution for specific expenses (fees, boarding etc)
Links to scholarships from student's preferred institution and one other related institution Specific: Private scholarships for certain careers Links to up to two different scholarships targeted towards student's preferred career (may or may not be linked to a school)
Specific: Private scholarships (foundations and municipalities) for students meeting eligibility criteria Links to any private scholarships for students meeting eligibility criteria e.g. age, duration of degree program, first or second year student, living in a particular municipality
School type Quality tier of school Mean earnings, employability given for:
Student preferred school: X (if listed) Quality tier of X (high/medium/low) X if preference given; else nothing
Selective school Same quality tier as X/highest quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools
Selective school Lower quality tier than X/medium quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools Less selective school Same quality tier as X/highest quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools Less selective school Lower quality tier as X/medium quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools Table 3 . Baseline Balance Note: Variables in this table were collected from students at career fairs and from the online survey administered at baseline. Selective school is defined as a school belonging to the DEMRE group, for which application must be made through the centralized application system. PSU is the college entry examination. All balance regressions contain stratum fixed effects. Missing values are balanced across experimental group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate statistically significant differences. We are able to verify whether financial aid emails bounced or not, and whether any students replied to the email sent by PUC. We can verify whether returns emails were opened at all, since we administered the treatment from a single University of Chile email address. Note: The regression includes stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). Column (2) presents coefficients from the pooled treatment; columns (3) and (4) present coefficients for the separate treatments. The set of controls include baseline variables: expected PSU score and high school GPA. MDE is the minimum detectable effect size for each outcome, given sample design. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Note: All regressions include stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). Column (2) presents coefficients from the pooled treatment; columns (3) and (4) Note: All regressions include stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). Column (2) presents coefficients from the pooled treatment; columns (3) and (4) 
Figures Figure 1. PSU Scores in the Control Group
Note: PSU is the college entry examination.
Figure 2. Enrollment Choices by PSU Score, Control Froup
Note: PSU is the college entry examination. 
Figure 3. Timeline of Treatments Relative to Applications Deadlines
Note: Solid lines represent times during which students could take actions (e.g. to apply for scholarships, to apply or enroll in a higher education institution). Dotted lines represent times in which students could take actions but in which this action was unlikely to happened. For instance, in late December students have just finished high school and have not learned yet their PSU results or the results from the first round of scholarships run by the central government. It is therefore unlikely that they have already applied to a less selective institution. Dashed lines represent waiting times. In order to apply for the state scholarships, you should fill in the online form FUAS (Unique form for socioeconomic certificate) that you can find at www.becasycreditos.cl.
[Para postular a las becas estatales, deberás rellenar el formulario online FUAS (Formulario Único de Acreditación Socioeconómica) que lo encontrarás en la página www.becasycreditos.cl] When you fill in this form you are automatically applying to all the state scholarships and loans. If you are on your first year you must sent the form before 27st November.
[Al rellenar este formulario estarás automáticamente postulando a todas las becas y créditos estatales. Si eres alumno de primero año, tienes hasta el día 27 de noviembre para enviar el formulario.] According to your profile you could also apply to the following scholarships or loans. [Debes saber, que toda carrera tiene un Arancel Real y uno de Referencia. El Arancel Real corresponde a lo que debes pagar al año por una determinada carrera. El Arancel de Referencia es el monto máximo del arancel de cada carrera e institución que el Estado puede financiar, ya sea a través de becas o créditos.]
As you can see there will be always a difference amongst these fees. Thus, it is important that you also look for other private scholarships. Estimado <nombre alumno>: Considerando la carrera de tu preferencia, a continuación te presentamos el ingreso y la empleabilidad de ésta, y otras similares, en distintas instituciones .  TABLE <List and options>  Example For instance, for the case of the first career the average salary <years after> years after of graduation is <salary>. The <%> of the students of this career were working the second year after graduation Por ejemplo, en el caso de primera carrera el salario promedio <núm. año> después de la titulación es <salario>. El <%> de los alumnos de esta carrera se encontraban trabajando el segundo año luego de egresar. Questions Do you think that this is a good option? Did any of the alternatives draw your attention? These and other questions you must ask yourself before deciding about your professional future. ¿Te parece una buena opción? ¿Alguna de las alternativas, llamó tu atención? Estas y otras preguntas debes hacerte antes de decidir sobre tu futuro educacional Nota 1
The income data associated with an institutions correspond to the fourth year after graduation. Los datos de ingreso asociado a una institución corresponden al cuarto año después de egreso.
Second page Title
How did we generate and get the information that we give? ¿Cómo generamos y cómo obtuvimos la información que te entregamos? Illustration Ilustración: mono de pregunta Information Text
What did we do?  We classified the careers according the accreditation years. That way we got 3 quality groups: high (+year), medium and low (-year).
How did we select the career within the same quality group?  We selected the career with the best average salaries.  If two career have the same salary, we broke the ties taking into account: lower tuition and fees, high employability and, if none of this criteria worked we chose randomly.
What information do we send? And why this information?
 If we know the what career and in what the intuition you want to study, we give you the available information about your preference and about institutions with similar quality that teach your career.  If we know what degree you want to study but no the institution, we give you information about your career in high and medium quality institution.  If we know only know the subarea in which you want to study, we give you information about careers within this subarea in high and medium quality institution.  If we know only know the area in which you want to study, we give you information about careers within this area in high and medium quality institution.  If we know nothing about your preferences, we give you information about the area with the best return and the careers taught in high and medium quality institutions within this area.
¿Qué hicimos?  Clasificamos las carreras según años de acreditación. Así obtuvimos 3 grupos de calidad: alta (+ años), media y baja (-años). ¿Cómo seleccionamos carreras dentro del mismo grupo de calidad?
 Seleccionamos las carreras con mejor salario promedio.  Si dos carreras tienen igual salario, desempatamos considerando: menor arancel, menor costo de matrícula, mayor empleabilidad y, si ninguno de estos criterios desempataba, elegimos al azar. ¿Qué información te entregamos? ¿Y por qué esa información?
 Si sabemos qué carrera y en que institución quieres estudiar, te entregamos la información de la que disponemos sobre tu preferencia y sobre instituciones de calidad similar que impartan tu carrera.  Si sabemos qué carrera quieres estudiar, pero no la institución, te entregamos información sobre la carrera en instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media.  Si sabemos solo en que subárea quieres estudiar, te entregamos información sobre carreras de la subárea en instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media.  Si sabemos sólo en qué área quieres estudiar, te entregamos información sobre carreras del área en instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media.  Si no sabemos nada sobre tus preferencias, te entregamos información sobre el área de mejor retorno y de carreras impartidas por instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media en esta área. Notes: Variables in this table were collected from students at career fairs and from the online survey administered at baseline. Restricted sample refers to the set of students who did not apply to selective schools or who were not enrolled into any selective school. Selective school is defined as a school belonging to the DEMRE group, for which application must be made through the centralized application system. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0. 
Appendix
Appendix Figure 1. Correlation between PSU Score and Expected Wage Misinformation at Baseline
Note: The figure plots quantiles of the PSU distribution on the x-axis and share of individuals that did not report expected wage (left figure) or the average gap between expected wage and average wage for preferred career as reported in MiFuturo. Solid lines are non-parametric regressions. 
